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This article is in our series on probabilistic thinking and the evaluation of therapies, 1700-1900 
 
Introducing French dramatis personae 
 
 
Let me begin with four outstanding French scientists, born in 
the 1740s, who knew each other and who all felt that an 
interest in the evaluation of a therapy would be best satisfied 
by calculating the probability of its success. 
 
Antoine de Lavoisier (b.1743) was to become one of the 
most renowned scientists in Europe. Although primarily an 
experimental chemist (who discovered oxidation), he was also 
an economist, and an aristocratic high official (a toll collector 
and therefore beheaded during the French revolution). In the 
mid-1760s already, precisely when issues of probabilism were 
debated in the Académie des Sciences, he sought for 
membership of this eminent body. In his recorded works we 
find, undated, but probably around 1784, a note that is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
The art of drawing conclusions from experiments and 
observations consists in evaluating the probabilities, and 
in judging whether they are large enough, or numerous 
enough, to amount to proof. This type of calculation is 
 
 
more complicated and more difficult than one thinks; it 
demands great sagacity and is, in general, beyond the 
powers of most men. It is upon their errors in this type of 
calculation that is founded the success of charlatans, 
sorcerers and alchemists … and, generally, of all those 
who deceive themselves or attempt to prey on the 
credulity of the public.  
And he continued even more specifically, maybe in 
remembrance of the Bernoulli - d’Alembert debate of which he 
must have been aware: 
It is above all in medicine that the difficulty of evaluating 
the probabilities is greater … Nature, left to its own 
resources, cures a large number of maladies; when 
remedies are employed it is infinitely difficult to determine 
what is due to Nature and what to the remedy. Thus, for 
all that most people regard the cure of a disease as a 
proof of the efficacy of the remedy, in the eyes of a wise 
man this result is only a probability, more or less large, 
and this probability cannot be converted into certainty 
except by a large number of results of the same kind 
(Transl. by IML Donaldson from Lavoisier 1865, p 509; 
Donaldson 2016; Donaldson 2016 a).  
 
And so it truly is. Handling probability is indispensable, but, as 
we shall see, doctors took a long time to understand this.  
 
Scientists were more progressively minded, at least in their 
statements, the calculus of probabilities awaked the interest of 
French mathematicians, one of whom was also a clinician.  
 
Marie-Jean-Antoine Nicolas de Condorcet (b.1743) was an 
aristocrat who had published several noteworthy mathematical 
contributions, including on the calculus of probabilities. He 
became an important official (Inspecteur Général de la 
Monnaie) and Perpetual Secretary of the Académie des 
Sciences. 
 
Jacob Bernoulli’s early call for a science of decision-making 
influenced him and in his Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la 
probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Essay 
 
 
on the application of probability theory to decision making by 
majority vote, 1785) he argued how and why probability theory 
should also serve in political and social life. His 1785 Essai was 
Condorcet's most sophisticated mathematical undertaking. He 
attempted to set down the rules needed to calculate the 
veracity of decisions affecting a variety of civic values and 
matters of criminal justice.  
 
Formerly, probability theory had proven its worth in estimating 
life annuities or rates of maritime insurance. Now, Condorcet 
argued, calculation could also serve in an entirely different 
domain, the operations of the human mind, "where it weighs 
the grounds for belief and calculates the probable truth of 
testimony or decisions", that is, the consequences of decisions. 
Events in pre-revolutionary France, prompted by passion and 
factionalism, proved the need for such a guide. Though never 
completed, this “social mathematics” remained a part of 
Condorcet’s legacy to mathematicians, social theorists and it 
influenced some members of the medical profession (Daston 
1995, pp 210-224).  
 
Philippe Pinel (b.1745), the reformer of French psychiatry, a 
fine clinician and chief of psychiatric hospitals in Paris, was a 
mythical figure in his lifetime for allegedly liberating psychiatric 
patients from their chains (Weiner 2007). He also held a 
diploma in mathematics. In his Traité medico-philosophique de 
l’aliénation mentale (1800) (A treatise on insanity, also 
published in an incomplete English edition in 1806), he wrote: 
 
 To be authentic and conclusive, an experiment must 
involve a large number of patients submitted to general 
rules and treated according to a determined order… 
Finally, favourable as well as unfavourable events have to 
be reported [from the experiment] so that we can learn 
from both. That is to say, if one wants to establish 
treatment methods for disease on solid foundations, they 
must use the theory of probabilities, which is already 
happily applied to various fields of civic life (Transl. from 
Pinel 1809, pp 402-403). 
 
 
 
Pinel’s reference to the application of probabilities to “various 
fields of civic life” was an allusion to Bernoulli’s Ars conjectandi 
(which he erroneously attributed to Daniel Bernoulli). Finally, 
he specified that numerical data were needed to compare two 
competing methods of medical treatment (p 406-407) and 
concluded: “…it is necessary to apply the elementary notions of 
the calculus of probabilities” (p 424). As an illustration, he used 
data obtained at La Salpétrière psychiatric hospital in Paris and 
calculated the proportions of various groups of patients who 
had recovered. Put simply, he compared these probabilities, 
albeit not by defining the groups by the treatments they had 
received (Sheynin 1982, p 250). 
 
Pinel repeated the same thoughts and data in a paper published 
in 1807: 
 
Medicine must be based on the theory of probabilities … 
on which the methods of treating disease has henceforth 
to be founded if one wants to establish them on solid 
grounds.  
 
In the same paper he complained about the habit of 
suppressing unsuccessful cases, thus preventing medicine from 
acquiring the character of a true science, an achievement it will 
only attain through the application of the calculus of 
probabilities (Transl. from quotes in Sheynin 1982, p 250. 
Dickersin, Chalmers 2010; Bird 2018; Bishop, Gill 2019).    
 
Here we have further examples of conscious, yet pre-
mathematical probabilistic reasoning. Others were soon to 
follow. Despite their reiteration, however, Pinel’s references to 
probability were mere words, a loose allusion, implying no more 
than calculating proportions. His work contains no example of 
the application of the calculus of probabilities. Finally, as shown 
in Part 1of this manuscript, his method did not differ from that 
of Jurin. Practical limitations, such as wide dissimilarity of his 
case histories, restricted the application of quantitative 
evaluations.  
 
 
 
However, the contributions of French mathematicians, such as 
those of Laplace and Poisson, continued to assert the potential 
usefulness of probabilistic approaches to clinical medicine. 
  
Pierre Simon de Laplace (b.1749) was the foremost French 
mathematician, physicist and astronomer of his day and 
remains one of the great scientists of all times; his pupil 
Poisson called him “the French Newton” (Stigler 1986, p 31). 
Laplace was one of the founding fathers of probability theory, 
and the Bayesian interpretation of probability was developed 
mainly by him (Stigler 1986, chapter 3). The mathematician-
historian Robert Matthews will discuss Bayes’s theorem, a 
particular approach of statistical inference, in a forthcoming 
paper. 
  
In some lectures given in 1795, Laplace reaffirmed Condorcet’s 
optimism concerning social mathematics: “Let us apply to the 
political and moral sciences the method founded upon 
observation and calculation, which has served us so well in the 
natural sciences.” Yet, echoing Jacob Bernoulli, he was sceptical 
about their usefulness because of passions and self-interests 
involved in decision-making in these fields. As the medical 
historian Terence Murphy has noted, Laplace sensed that “…the 
more vital the issue, the more likely are vested interests to 
counter the voice of reason”, so it was useless to use the 
calculus of probabilities to determine the truth of such 
decisions. Yet he hoped for its valuable use in the future 
(Murphy 1981, p 305). He expressed this in two, albeit short, 
passages within two works. 
 
 
Laplace explicitly mentioned therapeutics in his Théorie 
analytique des probabilités (Analytical theory of probabilities, 
1812): 
  
The calculus of probabilities can make us appreciate the 
advantages and inconveniencies of the methods employed 
in the conjectural sciences. Thus, in order to recognize the 
best treatment in healing an illness it suffices to try each 
of them on the same number of patients while keeping all 
the circumstances perfectly alike. The superiority of the 
 
 
most advantageous treatment will be manifested more 
and more as the number of cases increases; and the 
calculus [of probabilities] will make known the probability 
corresponding to its [the treatment's] advantage (Transl. 
from de Laplace 1820, p LXXVII). 
 
Thus, the calculus would make known probability corresponding 
to a treatment’s] advantage, as long as there were sufficient 
cases and an unvarying relationship between treatment and 
outcome exists - which did not reflect doctors’ experiences/ 
expectations. 
 
His Essai philosophique sur les probabilités (Philosophical essay 
on probabilities 1814) was the Introduction to the Théorie 
analytique, added to its later editions, but it was also published 
separately. As such it contains no mathematical formulae; it 
typically opens with a general statement: 
 
One may even say, strictly speaking, that almost all our 
knowledge is only probable; and in the small number of 
things that we are able to know with certainty, is the 
mathematical sciences themselves. The principal means of 
arriving at the truth - induction and analogy – are based 
on probabilities (de Laplace 1995, p 1).  
  
 
Although he further wrote that "the theory of probabilities is 
fundamentally only good sense reduced to calculation", Laplace 
wanted to submit intuitive judgments to the rigors of analysis.  
 
His clear, consciously formulated plea for the use of formal 
probability in therapeutic evaluation underestimated the 
difficulty resulting from his requirement for “a sufficient 
number” (Sheynin 1978, p 285), after realizing that, for the 
time being, the number was beyond a doctor's competence. 
Furthermore, the calculations assumed a constant relation 
between causes and observed putative effects. This inherent 
constant relation would have troubled physicians. In fact, 
whether numerical methods could actually influence the choice 
of a remedy was not raised, and Laplace himself never applied 
 
 
the calculus of probabilities to medical phenomena (Murphy 
1981).  
 
Laplace’s Théorie was extremely influential. Not only did it have 
six contemporary editions, but it was translated into English 
(1820), German (1820), and Dutch (18…?); and it is still in 
print in many languages. Yet, mathematically speaking, theory 
of probability stagnated because new fields of application 
(physics, biology) had not yet appeared. Furthermore, his book 
was difficult to read. Almost the only mathematician elaborating 
on Laplace’s work during this period was his pupil, Siméon 
Denis Poisson, 32 years his junior (Sheynin 1976, pp 179-180). 
(I shall discuss him later in Part 2/2 of this series).  
 
In fact, at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th 
centuries, contemporaries agreed that observation and 
“experience” were the basis of sound therapeutics (Murphy 
1981, p 309). But experience could have many meanings. In 
French medical journals and Dictionaires it might include, 
during these decades, subjective opinions, beliefs, based on 
single case descriptions or on extended follow-up, as well as 
hospital data. Furthermore, statistical work on social groups 
(which would become public health) was flourishing in France in 
the 1820s. Not until the mid-1830s, however, were 
methodological issues about quantitative comparisons in the 
evaluation of therapies debated - in Paris, of course.  
 
Unconscious probabilists 
I came across two remarkable French authors of very diverse 
social standing who remain unnoticed, not only in relation to 
their probabilistic thinking in medicine. Neither of them seems 
to have been aware that he was a probabilist. 
 
In the early 18th century the question whether an absolutely 
necessary amputation had to be performed as soon as possible 
after an injury or after a few days’ delay had been 
preoccupying surgeons for some time. Theoretically you could 
argue for or against both methods. An ordinary mid-18th 
century army surgeon, decided to solve the question using a 
trial. An army surgeon named JF Faure, whose Christian 
 
 
names and date of birth I was unable to find, described the 
experiment in detail: 
 
[This experiment was done] in the hope that we would 
have a less equivocal success and also in order to affirm 
the principles by tests repeated sufficiently to overcome 
the disbelief of the most prejudiced. Ten English wounded, 
out of a number of about one thousand who had been 
taken to the hospitals of Douay after the battle of 
Fontenoy [1745], were therefore set aside.  Their wounds 
were such that amputation was essential in most of them… 
It was simply a question of whether the amputation was 
carried out sooner or later (Transl. from Faure 1759, p 
353). 
 
All ten survived. Faure compared this outcome to the overall 
mortality of those who had received immediate amputation. 
Adducing further testimonies and numbers he calculated the 
chance of healing: It amounted to nine out of ten after delayed 
intervention, and to between one in ten and one in three after 
immediate amputation. He concluded that “it seemed to me 
difficult not to be impressed by an experiment repeated ten 
times and always with the same success” and he sent a 
“Mémoire” to the French Académie Royale de Chirurgie (Faure 
1759).  
 
The Academy’s decision of to award its 1754 annual prize to 
Faure made delayed amputation respectable. But the issue 
continued to be debated on the same basis of retro-and 
prospective trials for another hundred years, particularly from 
German and British military statistics (Tröhler 2000).  
 
My second example of an unconscious probabilist is the 
distinguished surgeon Baron Anthelme-Balthasar Richerand 
(b.1779). He was of provincial stock. After moving to Paris he 
became a protégé of Cabanis. His word was influent, for he 
authored a textbook of physiology (ten editions), then was chief 
surgeon of the Hôpital St.Louis, a co-founder of the Académie 
de Médecine (1820), and finally wrote popular texts on 
medicine.  
 
 
 
Richerand proposed a solution for a seven-decade dispute 
about the treatment of cataract. Couching (i.e. displacement) 
of the opaque lens had been the standard therapy since 
Antiquity, and a problem arose when Jacques Daviel (b.1683 or 
1693?) published his method for extracting the lens in 1753). 
Supporters of each method had fought on the basis of case 
series. 
 
In his Des progrès récens [sic!] de la chirurgie (Recent 
advances in surgery, 1825) Richerand dealt with the 
uncertainty hovering above various approaches to treating 
illnesses. He observed that treatments for cataract in particular 
“still divide the supporters of extraction and couching of the 
lens” [author’s italics]. But there was “only one way open to 
provide an escape from this maze of contradictory opinions and 
to resolve this important point in surgical doctrine”. And this 
was, in today’s terms, a prospective trial, comparing 
simultaneously “a certain number of patients” placed in the 
same circumstances, then operated on comparatively under the 
eyes of the Academy.  
 
[For] an academic body alone, the sole interest of which is 
that of truth, is able to undertake and follow up such an 
experiment. Even the most able surgeon, and who in 
exercising his art aims at the truth with the greatest 
honesty and good faith, would be unable to defend himself 
against a multitude of prejudices, the existence and power 
of which he often ignores. Thence, what credibility can one 
attribute to those men of bad faith, for whom truth is 
nothing other than fashion acquired by misrepresentation? 
And what have we to understand by what they name their 
‘successes’ by the use of this or that method? (Transl. 
from Richerand 1825, p 27). 
 
Richerand did not mention a single word about the probability 
involved as a representation of the much-maligned uncertainty.  
We would say the above was the outline of a protocol for a 
prospective controlled clinical trial, albeit, without 
randomization, specification of outcome or method of analysis. 
No trial appears to have taken place, but ten years later, some 
of Richerand’s colleagues from the Royal Academy discussed it 
 
 
– without quoting him - and concluded that they had settled the 
debate.  
 
Defence of the status quo 
Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis (b.1757), a Paris physician 
and hospital administrator, was also a theoretician at the height 
of the currents of his time. He formulated earlier reactions to 
quantitative techniques in his Du degré de certitude de la 
médecine (On the degree of certainty in medicine, 1798), 
written in 1788. Cabanis referred to d’Alembert and Condorcet 
(a friend) when he wrote “Each science has its own kind of 
proofs”: A “happy instinct”, i.e. a non-quantifiable talent, a kind 
of “sympathie morale”, allowed a doctor to choose. In effect, 
Cabanis was defending the anarchic status quo of clinical 
practice. He remained attached to the idea that medical 
practice had a specific nature. This ruled out any formal alliance 
with the natural sciences and justified claims for criteria of 
medical knowledge independent of any formal standards 
established in other fields of human enquiry (Murphy 1981, 
Canguilhem 1970). His book, translated into German (1799) 
and English, was widely distributed, including in America. It 
was an early expression of the later widely held feeling among 
doctors that there should be no ‘strangers’ (that is, 
mathematicians) at the bedside, encroaching on the ‘sacred’ 
field of medicine. This feeling found expression in two academic 
debates two decades later. 
 
(To be continued) 
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